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Supervisors and policy makers pay increasing attention to the possible
procyclical nature of banks’ behaviour. Indeed, to guarantee macro and financial
stability, it is important to understand if, and to what extent, banks are affected
by the macroeconomy and if there are second round effects. This paper provides
a comprehensive investigation on these issues using a large dataset of Italian
intermediaries over the period 1985-2002. In particular, estimating both static
and dynamic models, it investigates whether loan loss provisions, non-
performing loans and the return on assets show a cyclical pattern. The estimated
relations are then employed to carry out simple stress tests aiming at assessing
the effects of macroeconomic shocks on banks’ balance sheets.
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BANKS’ PERFORMANCE OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE:
A PANEL ANALYSIS ON ITALIAN INTERMEDIARIES
Mario Quagliariello
1.   Introduction
In recent years the issue of the possible procyclicality of banks’ activity has drawn the
attention of both academics and policy makers. Indeed, to guarantee macro and financial
stability, it is crucial to understand if, and to what extent, banks are affected by the
evolution of the macroeconomic environment and if there are second round impacts. On the
one hand, if the business cycle does influence banks, financial surveillance may need to be
strengthened during recessionary phases, when it is more likely that banks’ fragility arises.
On the other hand, if banks’ reaction to macroeconomic shocks does exacerbate the effects
of the downturn, it is appropriate to establish rules aiming at alleviating the procyclicality of
banks’ operations.
The stylised facts suggest that, at the beginning of an expansionary phase in the
economy, firms’ profits tend to increase, asset prices rise and customers’ expectations are
optimistic. Expansion of aggregate demand leads to a remarkable, often more than
proportional, growth in bank lending and in economy’s indebtedness. During the boom,
banks may underestimate their risk exposures, relaxing credit standards and reducing
provisions for future losses.
After the peak of the cyclical upturn, customers’ profitability worsens, borrower’s
creditworthiness deteriorates and non-performing assets are revealed, thus causing losses in
banks’ balance sheets (cyclicality). This may be associated with a fall of asset prices that, in
turn, further affects customers’ financial wealth and depresses the value of collaterals.
Besides, the possible rise of unemployment reduces households’ disposable income and
their ability to repay their debts. Banks’ risk exposure increases, thus requiring larger
provisions and higher levels of capital, exactly when it is more expensive or simply not
available. Intermediaries may react by reducing lending, especially if they have thin capital
buffers above the minimum capital requirement, thus exacerbating the effects of the
economic downturn (procyclicality).
The approaching reform of the Basel Accord on banks’ capital requirements (Basel
II) has given rise to new concerns about the behaviour of the financial intermediaries3
through the business cycle. It is well known that the main goal of the new accord is to make
capital requirements more risk-sensitive by substituting in their calculation the fixed
weights attached to categories of borrowers with weights determined on the basis of the
individual creditworthiness, as measured by agencies’ ratings or banks’ internal ratings. It
has been argued that higher sensitivity of capital requirements could amplify the
procyclicality of banks’ activity. In fact, in bad times, increased risk would lead to higher
capital requirements which, in turn, may cause a contraction of credit supply.
In principle, many banking variables are potentially able to convey signals about the
evolution of banks’ health over the business cycle; however, loan loss provisions and bad
debts have been generally considered the “transmission channels” of the macroeconomic
shocks to banks’ balance sheets.
Banks make loan loss provisions against profits when they believe that borrowers will
default; this is the tool they can use for adjusting the (historical) value of loans to reflect
their true value. Provisions affect both banks’ profitability, since they represent a cost for
the intermediary, and capital, since they reduce the book value of the assets.
It is common to distinguish between static (specific) and dynamic (general)
provisions, where the former are based on current conditions of debtors and are made only
when losses are known to occur, while the latter are set against expected losses on non-
impaired loans
1. The principle that justifies dynamic provisions is that when a loan is
granted, there is already a positive and measurable probability that the bank will incur
losses due to the debtor’s inability to honour his obligations. If loan loss provisions were
forward-looking, the volume of bank capital should be related to the size of the unexpected
losses and the procyclical effects of provisioning policies would be limited. Prudent banks
might also use loan loss provisions to stabilise their earnings over time, by
reducing/increasing the flow of provisions when their performance worsens/improves.
In practice, loan loss provisions are often backward-looking, as banks tend to
underestimate future losses in periods of economic expansion because of disaster myopia
(Guttentag et al., 1986), herding behaviour (Rajan, 1994) or because higher provisions are
interpreted by stakeholders as a signal of lower quality portfolios (Ahmed et al., 1996).
                                                          
1 Cavallo and Majoni (2002) point out that specific provisions are thus similar to write offs. This may
explain also why provisions and write offs are very often contemporaneous, even though the former
should logically precede the latter.4
Banks tend to provision against actual rather than expected losses also because of
accounting and fiscal rules that allow specific provisions only against impaired debts and do
not permit tax deductibility for general provisions, since they cannot be documented and
can potentially be exploited by banks to reduce their fiscal burden.
Sub-standard loans are also considered as a good proxy for asset quality and a reliable
leading indicator for bank fragility. In fact, there is clear evidence that the proportion of
non-performing loans dramatically increases before and during banking crises (Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Gonzales-Hermosillo, 1999). The stock of the outstanding bad
debts is however a rough measure of credit quality, in fact it can decrease just because some
of the credits are written off. For this reason, the flow of new bad debts, i.e. the amount of
loans classified as bad debts for the first time in the reference period, can be considered to
be a more precise indicator of the banks’ portfolio riskiness.
Much empirical work has tried to verify the correctness of these stylised facts. Such
investigations have generally focussed on a single banks’ performance indicator, using
relatively small datasets; cross-country comparisons are prevalent, while cross-bank
investigations (within the same country) are less common.
This paper contributes to this stream of research using a large panel of Italian
intermediaries whose data are available for the period 1985-2002. With respect to previous
works, the paper attempts to provide a more comprehensive framework, though in a
reduced-form modelling context, analysing the movements of loan loss provisions, new bad
debts and profitability over the business cycle. Both static fixed-effects and dynamic models
are estimated to verify if banks’ performance is linked (also) to the general economic
climate and to understand the timing of banks’ reactions to economic changes. The
outcomes of models are then employed to carry out stress tests that simulate the impact of
some macroeconomic shocks on the Italian banking system.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section I review the
empirical literature dealing with the procyclicality of banks’ behaviour. Sections 3 and 4 are
devoted to the description of the data used in the empirical exercise and of the econometric
methodology. Sections 5 and 6 present the estimated models, their main findings and some
robustness checks. In the last section, a sensitivity analysis is carried out on the basis of the
estimated coefficients. Some concluding remarks are finally provided.5
1.  The review of the literature
There is a huge empirical literature studying the linkages between banking sector
performance and the business cycle. The starting point of the analyses on procyclicality is
that the models of banks performance that only include financial ratios as explanatory
variables cannot take into account systematic problems arising from an adverse evolution of
the macroeconomic environment. The general framework is therefore the following:
Bank-specific variableit = bank specificit-j + macroeconomic variablesit-j
where the bank data might be either at single bank or banking system level and the
regressors either coincident or lagged. The specification can thus be a simple static model
(i=1 and j=0), a distributed lag model (i=1 and j>0) or a panel (i>1, either cross-bank or
cross-country).
Since credit risk is still the main source of instability for most banks, the dependent
variable is very often a measure of loan quality.
For instance, Salas and Saurina (2002) analyse the relation between problem loans
and the economic cycle in Spain, over the period 1985-1997. They observe that, during
economic booms, banks tend to expand lending activity to increase their market share; this
result is often reached by lending to borrowers of lower credit quality. They report that bad
loans increase in recessionary phases and that the contemporary impact is remarkably
higher than the delayed one, concluding that macroeconomic shocks are quickly transmitted
to banks’ balance sheets. Conversely, non-financial sector’s fragility indicators such as
households and firms’ indebtedness appear to be not significant.
In the same spirit, focusing on the banking crises of four Nordic countries (Denmark,
Norway, Sweden and Finland), Pesola (2001) assesses the usefulness of macroeconomic
shocks in explaining two different indicators of bank distress such as the ratio of loan losses
to lending and the number of non-financial companies’ bankruptcies per capita. According
to his results, the high level of both corporate and households’ indebtedness along with an
increase in the interest rate above the expected one and a GDP growth below the forecasts
contributed to the banking crises in Sweden, Norway and Finland; the deregulation dummy
and lending growth variables come out to be significant as well.
The analysis performed by Gambera (2000) is quite different in style. He uses6
bivariate VAR systems and impulse response functions to study how economic
development affects bank loan quality. With respect to panel estimation, the VAR
methodology allows all variables to be endogenously determined and has the advantage of
fully capturing the interactions between bank and macro variables. The author uses the ratio
of delinquencies to total loans and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans as
alternative indicators of financial distress and estimates a bivariate system for each series of
macroeconomic variables. His results suggest that a narrow number of macroeconomic
variables (namely bankruptcy filings, farm income, annual product, housing permits and
unemployment) are good predictors for the problem loans ratio.
Other authors focus on the evolution of provisioning policies through the business
cycle since loan loss provisions should reflect changes of borrowers’ creditworthiness and
banks’ sentiment concerning the health of the real economy.
Understanding banks’ provisioning behaviour is, for instance, the goal of Cavallo and
Majnoni (2002) and Laeven and Majnoni (2003). The latter authors analyse large
commercial banks’ policies in various countries to verify whether intermediaries use
provisions for stabilising their income. They find that bankers, on average, smooth their
earnings, but they create too little provision in good (macroeconomic) times. In other
words, they find a negative relation between provisions and loan and GDP growth,
suggesting that banks provision during and not before recessions, thus magnifying the
effects of the negative phase of the business cycle. Similar evidence is provided by the
European Central Bank (2001) in its survey on provisioning practices in the EU; the report
points out also that there is an almost simultaneous relation between provisions and non-
performing loans; in other words, banks seem to record provisions only when credit risk
actually materialises. With reference to the relation between provisions and profitability,
there is no clear evidence of income-smoothing.
Similarly to Laeven and Majnoni, Pain (2003) and Arpa et al. (2001) investigate the
influence of the business cycle on loan loss provisions of UK and Austrian banks
respectively. The former author considers a large set of explanatory variables proxying
macroeconomic disturbances, firms and households’ indebtedness, financial and real asset
prices shocks, and documents that provisions exhibit some cyclical dependence. He also
finds that bank specific factors are relevant as well: lending to riskier sectors is generally
associated with higher provisions; in particular, mortgage banks provision less than
commercial banks since their loans are typically collateralized. Arpa et al. (2001),7
estimating a simple distributed lag model, conclude that provisions increase in periods of
falling real GDP growth. They also find evidence that provisions are higher in times of
rising bank profitability, supporting the income-smoothing hypothesis.
An attractive view is provided by Bikker and Hu (2002), who estimate an unbalanced
panel to evaluate the procyclicality of banks’ provisions for a sample of 26 OECD countries
between 1979 and 1999. They find that the coefficients on GDP growth and inflation have a
negative sign, while that of unemployment rate is significantly positive. However, in years
of higher net interest income the amount of provisions is higher, thus supporting the
income-smoothing hypothesis. Therefore, the authors claim that, even if provisions go
down in favourable (macroeconomic) times, banks tend to reserve more in good years (i.e.,
when profits are higher); as a result, banks are less procyclical than it would appear just
looking at their dependence on the business cycle.
In a recent paper, Valckx (2003) considers the loan loss provisioning policy of EU
banks using a sample of 15 European banking systems and a small panel of large EU banks.
According to his results, loan loss provisions are determined by GDP growth, interest rates
and some bank specific indicators both at sector level and for individual banks. The positive
relation between income margin and provisions suggests that the income-smoothing
hypothesis for EU banks applies, thus contradicting the ECB’s findings.
Although credit quality is considered one of the main indicators of bank fragility, a
relevant part of the literature on procyclicality focuses on other variables, typically P&L
account ratios, to get a more detailed picture of banks’ health over the business cycle.
For instance, Arpa et al. (2001) widen the focus of the analysis and examine the
relation between economic activity and banks’ profitability. They observe that falling
interest rates, rising real estate prices and inflation positively affect operating income; while
net interest income appears to be uncorrelated with GDP growth. Similarly, Meyer and
Yeager (2001), employing a sample of US rural banks, find that state-level coincident
macroeconomic variables are significant in explaining banks’ performance.
In their model of banks’ profitability, Bikker and Hu (2002) find that both the
contemporaneous and the lagged coefficient of GDP growth are significant and positive,
while the unemployment rate turns out to have a negative coefficient. Neither the short and
long-term interest rates nor share prices and money supply seem to have significant
explanatory power.8
The role of the business cycle in determining banks’ profits is also confirmed by
Gambacorta, Gobbi and Panetta (2001) who estimate a panel regression for eight euro-
countries, UK and USA over the period 1980-1997. They find that GDP growth positively
affects the return on equity (ROE), while inflation has a negative impact on banks’
earnings. The evolution of interest rates has an ambiguous effect on profitability.
Very recently, Gerlach et al. (2003) analyse the effect of macroeconomic
developments on profitability and asset quality of banks in Hong Kong. Their results are
consistent with the bulk of the previous empirical evidence. Furthermore, working on bank-
level data, they notice that small banks tend to be more sensitive to macroeconomic shocks
than larger ones. They argue that this is probably the consequence of small banks’ larger
exposures towards more risky firms that are more likely to be affected by the business
cycle.
Summing up, good economic conditions positively affect the quality of banks’
portfolios as measured by some kind of sub-standard loan ratio; business cycle also affects
bank profitability. Moreover, there is some evidence on the issue of whether intermediaries
tend to use loan loss provisions to smooth their income (i.e., they provision more when
earnings increase). However, it happens that they do not make enough provision in good
macroeconomic times (i.e., when GDP and loan growth are high). Therefore, when
economic conditions reverse, loan losses start to emerge, provisions rise, profitability
decreases and credit supply tends to decrease, thus amplifying the effects of the recession.
3. The data and the sample
The empirical analysis in this paper aims at investigating how Italian banks’
performance is affected by the changes of the general economic conditions. Following the
existing literature, the analysis focuses on the evolution of loan loss provisions (hereafter,
LLP), new bad debts and the return on assets (ROA), to test if they show the expected
cyclical pattern.
With reference to the sample, I select an unbalanced panel of 207 Italian
intermediaries whose accounting ratios are available for at least 5 years in the period
between 1985 and 2002. The sample excludes all the mutual banks (banche di credito9
cooperativo) and, to reduce measurement errors, the outliers
2. The resulting sample
represents around 90 per cent of Italian banking system’s consolidated total assets
3. Along
with this large unbalanced sample, I use a smaller panel of 11 large banks whose data are
available for the whole period under exam (18 years) to carry out robustness checks
4.
A summary of the characteristics of the two samples is provided in table 1.
Table 1
Accounting ratios for the individual institutions are built up using the supervisory
statistics that intermediaries are required to report to the Bank of Italy and the
information of the Italian Credit Register; all the macroeconomic variables are drawn
from the database of the Research Department of the Bank of Italy that collects data
from various sources. In general, the macroeconomic variables and most of the bank
specific indicators are available at a quarterly frequency and over quite a long time
span, even though data homogeneity may be an issue for some time series.
Unfortunately, P&L account ratios are only available on a semi-annual basis since 1993;
before that date they were annual. Since the focus of the paper is on the evolution of
banks’ performance through the business cycle, the longer time span is preferred to the
higher frequency of the observations. Annual data are therefore used.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarise the variables I consider in the analysis and provide some
descriptive statistics. Although I largely rely on supervisory data, most of the indicators can
be built up using alternative and (very often) publicly available sources (tab. 2).
Tables 2,3,4
Some of the dependent variables, namely loan loss provisions (LLP) and the flow of
new bad debts (RISKFL) vary by construction between 0 and 1; some authors have
suggested to use the log-odds transformation of such variables to create an unbounded
                                                          
2 I exclude outlier banks by eliminating the observations with values of the banks specific variables
(except SIZE) above and below the last and the first percentile respectively.
3 During the Nineties, the Italian banking system experienced an intense process of mergers and
acquisitions. To deal with the impact of these operations on the sample, I assumed that they took place at
the beginning of the sample period, consolidating the balance-sheet items of the banks involved.
4 The sample includes banks with total assets equal to at least 20 billion euros; it represents more than
65 per cent of Italian banks’ consolidated total assets.10
series between minus and plus infinity. Actually, this seems more a philosophical than a
practical issue. In fact, these variables are typically in the range 0-0.1, the correspondent
log-odds ratios are very far from varying between plus/minus infinite as well (tab. 4).
Finally, some concerns may derive from the presence of unit roots in the series
considered in the analysis. Im, Pesaran and Shin’s unit root tests for panel data are therefore
carried out; results for the three dependent variables are reported in table 5
5.
Table 5
Tests are performed including both a constant and a constant and time trend and
considering both the raw and the demeaned data. The t-bar statistics are always significant
at any conventional level, thus confirming that the series for loan loss provisions, new bad
debts and return on assets are stationary.
4. The econometric methodology
The analysis in this paper is carried out using a simple estimation strategy. I start with
a static (reduced form) regression using the least square dummy variable (LSDV) model,
since fixed effects seem a priori able to catch the heterogeneity across individuals, without
imposing restrictive conditions on the correlation between the regressors and the error
term
6.
I select the starting set of regressors according to the insights provided by the
economic theory and the empirical results that emerged in previous analyses. In principle,
several variables might be employed as proxies for the phase of the business cycle;
however, a preliminary investigation suggested to include GDP growth as the main
                                                          
5 For simplicity I present only the unit root tests for the dependent variables; tests are however carried
out for all the regressors as well. For the microeconomic explanatory variables, except RISKST, the tests
generally do not find significant evidence of the presence of a unit root. Interestingly, the standard
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests (ADF) performed on the aggregate time series fail to reject non-
stationarity, thus confirming the advantage in terms of power of also exploiting cross-sectional
information. Finally, it is worth noting that most of the macroeconomic series, even the first-differenced
ones, seem to be non-stationary according to the ADF tests. This result is however affected by the low
power of the test, especially in small samples and for near unit root processes (Enders, 1995).
6 It is beyond the scope of this paper to set up a complete structural model, even though a system of
simultaneous equations might be an appealing tool to describe the co-movements of the explanatory
variables.11
indicator of the aggregate economic activity
7.
The lag structure of the explanatory variables takes into account the plausible delay
with which macroeconomic shocks affect banks, the frequency of the observations and the
need to start from a quite general model without losing excessive degrees of freedom.
Therefore, as a general rule, the explanatory variables enter in the regressions with
the current value and one lag; GDP changes enter with 2 lags. Other bank specific variables
may have a different lag structure according to the particular dependent variable; details
will be provided in the following section. As a consequence of the insertion of lagged
variables, the period under examination is 1987-2002. At this stage, all the explanatory
variables are assumed to be exogenous
8.
The most parsimonious specification is subsequently chosen through the general-to-
simple approach, dropping the less significant variable at each stage and ending up with a
set of regressors significant at (at least) 5 per cent level. A preliminary diagnostic revealed
the presence of both groupwise heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation. I
consequently use the Newey-West robust standard errors for carrying out inference.
As robustness checks the most parsimonious representations are re-estimated using
the pooled regression and the random effect model.
Although the static model is the natural starting point for analysing the relation
between economic activity and banks’ stability, there is no consensus on its appropriateness
for explaining the behaviour of LLP and non-performing loans through the business cycle
9.
For instance, with regard to LLP, Pain (2003) wonders if banks register in their
balance sheets the full amount of any probable losses as soon as the borrower defaults
(suggesting that the static model is appropriate) or rather if they update the assessment of
the probable losses according to new information in each period (suggesting that provisions
                                                          
7 Indeed, the inclusion of investment and consumption changes produced some puzzling results. The
use of firms and households’ indebtedness, which are frequently found as important signals of fragility of
the real sector, did not significantly improve the performance of the model and dramatically reduced the
sample span, since homogeneous figures for these variables are available since 1990; moreover, there is
not clear-cut evidence on the expected effects of these variables (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Pain, 2003).
8 This finds some support in the results of the Hausman tests performed on the starting specification.
9 Valckx (2003), ECB (2001), Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) use a static model only, Salas and Saurina
(2002) prefer the dynamic equation, while Pain (2003) estimates both the static and the dynamic
specifications.12
are systematically related and, therefore, the dynamic specification may be better).
As far as non-performing loans are concerned, Salas and Saurina (2002) use a
dynamic equation under the assumption that the one-period variable is likely to be related to
that of the previous periods since problem loans are not immediately written off and they
can remain in the balance sheet for a long time.
To address these issues, the equations for loan loss provisions and new bad loans are
re-estimated using a dynamic specification. A relevant advantage of the dynamic model is
that it allows releasing the assumption of exogeneity of the regressors, which is unlikely to
hold, at least for some of the current levels of the bank specific variables.
When the lagged dependent variable is included in the set of the explanatory
variables, OLS estimates become inconsistent since regressors are no longer uncorrelated
with the error term. These problems can be addressed first-differencing the model, thus
eliminating the individual effects, and using instrumental variable estimators such as those
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991). The two
procedures produce consistent estimates; however the Arellano and Bond generalised
method of the moments (GMM) estimator is more efficient and is the one used herewith.
Following Arellano-Bond methodology, the differences of the strictly exogenous
regressors are instrumented with themselves and the dependent and
predetermined/endogenous variables are instrumented with their lagged levels
10. In
particular, while predetermined variables are instrumented using their levels lagged by one
or more periods, the dependent and the other endogenous variables are instrumented with
their levels lagged by two ore more periods. The procedure requires that there is no second
order correlation in the differenced equation; indeed, while the presence of first-order
autocorrelation in the error terms does not imply inconsistency of the estimates, the
presence of second-order autocorrelation makes estimates inconsistent (Arellano and Bond,
1991).
                                                          
10 In the following analysis, a regressor xit is considered: strictly exogenous if E[xitε is]=0 for all t and
s; predetermined if E[xitε is]=0 for s≥ t and E[xitε is]≠ 0 if s<t; endogenous if E[xitε is]=0 for s>t and E[xitε is]≠ 0
if s≤ t.13
5. The models and the results
5.1 Credit quality: loan loss provisions
In Italy, the rules banks must respect in the evaluation of their loans are established
by Legislative Decree 87/1992 on banks' individual and consolidated accounts
(implementing Directive 86/635/EEC) and by the Bank of Italy supervisory guidelines.
Loan loss provisions are typically raised on a case-by-case basis to cover potential
losses on non-performing loans (specific provisions); portfolio-specific general provisions
are allowed for homogeneous categories of loans, such as sectoral loans and country risk
exposures. Along with these adjustments, which are not reported as contra-assets, banks can
charge general provisions to the profit and loss account to create prudential reserves; they
are therefore set up against unforeseen events and do not have an asset-adjustment function,
but can be computed in the Tier 2 capital up to 1.25 per cent of the risk weighted assets.
11
Since, as mentioned above, the stock of LLP may decrease not only because of the
improvement of the debtors’ financial conditions but also because the underlying credits are
written off, the stock ratios are not necessarily timely indicators of banks’ health; I therefore
employ a flow rather than a stock measure.
Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between loan loss provisions and some of
the possible explanatory variables over the period 1985-2002.
Table 6
It emerges quite clearly that LLP are negatively related to GDP and credit growth
implying that, on average, banks provision less in favourable economic times. However, a
more careful analysis shows that the correlation between LLP and GDP is not stable over
time
12. Looking at figure 1, which plots the LLP ratio and the GDP growth, it is not possible
to individuate a clear-cut linkage.
Fig. 1
                                                          
11 In Italy, fiscal regulations allow banks to deduct from their gross income value adjustments on
credits (i.e. specific provisions) and general provisions up to 0.6 per cent of their total loans.14
Indeed, while the evidence for some years (e.g., 1986, 1993 and 2000) confirms that
banks provision less in good times, in other periods the relation tends to reverse and banks
seem to adopt more forward-looking and counter-cyclical provisioning policies.
5.1.1 Static model
The estimated model for loan loss provisions is the following:
LLPit = α + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui +εit
i= 1,..., 207; t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable
where LLP is the loan loss provision ratio, BSV are the bank specific variables, MV the
macroeconomic indicators, u the individual unobservable effects and ε the error term.
The starting model includes the following bank specific variables:
•   CREDGR (contemporaneous and lagged by 1-year) is the growth of performing
loans for each bank. It might signal either a positive phase of the business cycle if it
is led by demand factors (suggesting a negative sign) or an aggressive supply policy
of the banks that, in turn, entails the exposure to excessive risks and higher future
provisions (suggesting a positive sign). It is hence plausible that CREDGR shows a
negative sign when current values are considered and positive when lagged (Salas
and Saurina, 2002). However, the empirical evidence for other countries is
somewhat mixed and does not allow me to conclude that rapid credit growth
automatically implies future problems. It is interesting to note that if provisions
were dynamic the contemporaneous CREDGR should have a positive effect on LLP
as well.
•   The cost-to-income ratio (CIRATIO) is a commonly used indicator of banks’
efficiency; banks with higher values of the ratio are expected to be also less
effective in the selection of the borrowers and, in turn, to make higher provisions.
Besides, as reported by Pain (2003) inefficient banks may be tempted to engage in
riskier lending.
                                                                                                                                                                         
12 This is not completely unexpected. Pain (2003) finds that the relation between LLP and business
cycle for UK banks is not stable as well; for instance, he notices that provisions did not increase
significantly during the early eighties recession.15
•   The return on assets (ROA) is a measure of profitability before loan loss provisions
are registered on banks’ balance sheet. It can be thus used to test whether banks use
provisions to smooth their income. If the income-smoothing hypothesis held, the
coefficient of the ROA should have a positive sign.
•   RISKST provides a reliable proxy of the overall quality of bank’s portfolio. The
worse the creditworthiness of the customers, the higher the provisions against loan
losses. From a logical point of view, loan loss provisions should precede the
emergence of bad debts. In fact the amount of provisions is typically determined on
the basis of the losses experienced in the past. Therefore, one lag of the variable is
included as well.
•   RISKFL should pick up banks’ ability to select good new borrowers. The expected
sign is positive since banks that are not able to screen potential debtors are more
likely to incur loan losses in the future.
•   SIZE has been preliminarily included as a control variable and subsequently
dropped to avoid perplexing results probably due to its interaction with the
individual effects.
For the macroeconomic determinants, the selected indicators are:
•   GDPCC is the main and most direct measure of the aggregate economic activity
and, according to the prevailing view that banks do not provision in good times, it is
expected to be inversely related to loan loss provisions. Along with the
contemporaneous value, two lags are introduced in the specification to understand
the delay with which the worsening of the real economy affects credit quality.
•   BTPR is the interest rate on long-term Treasury bonds. Higher interest rates entail
an increasing debt burden for banks’ borrowers. Households and firms may thus
face greater difficulties in paying their loans back, especially if they are hugely
indebted (Benito et al. 2002). On the other hand, interest rates are typically higher in
expansionary phases when provisions are more likely to be low. The sign of the
coefficient is therefore ambiguous.
•   MIBC is the appreciation/depreciation of the stock exchange index and is a very
rough proxy for the state of health of financial markets. In periods of bullish
markets, the net wealth of households and firms tends to increase, thus making it16
easier to honour financial obligations (negative association). On the other hand,
when the value of collateral appears particularly high, banks may be tempted to
reduce their screening activity making their portfolios riskier (positive association).
Finally, financial markets often show a boom and bust pattern; in other words, the
bullish phase might precede a sharp decline of asset prices; according to this view,
one would expect a negative sign for the lagged coefficient and a positive sign for
the contemporaneous one.
•   The change of the unemployment rate (URC) is usually not considered as a leading
indicator; however, it influences the income of households and, in turn, their debt
servicing ability. Since this transmission mechanism is not instantaneous, it is
reasonable to consider the contemporaneous as well as the lagged values of the
variable.
•   The SPREAD between loans and deposits’ rates is a proxy for banks’ risk taking
behaviour that might lead to future problem loans and higher provisions. More
generally, the widening of financial spreads may anticipate cyclical
movements in aggregate activity and the increase of default risk (Davis and Henry,
1994).
Table 7 presents the regression results. Newey-West standard errors are calculated
assuming an autocorrelation up to order 2, but results are very similar when I use a higher
number of lags.
Table 7
Consistently with the findings of the literature, Italian banks seem to be short-sighted
to a certain extent. Indeed, they reduce their provisions when credit supply (CREDGR) and
GDP (GDPCC) increase, thus reinforcing the idea that provisions are not dynamic and that
intermediaries systematically underprovision during the upswing phases of the cycle.
However, GDP growth turns out to be significant only when lagged by 1 and 2 years and
the coefficient of the second lag is larger than that of the first one, implying that the cyclical
impacts are not instantaneous, but delayed. The overall long-run partial effect of 1 per cent
change of GDP is equal to around –0.23, comparable with the values provided by Pain
(2003), Valckx (2003) and Bikker and Hu (2002).
Turning to credit growth, as already mentioned it might be led by both demand and17
supply factors; it is therefore difficult to use such a variable to decide whether banks
pursuing higher lending growth rates are more likely to accept riskier borrowers. Since this
is a relevant issue, I re-estimate the model using a sort of  “abnormal” growth indicator (i.e.
the difference between the single bank’s growth rate and the average for the banking
system), which should mainly reflect supply-side determinants. The estimated coefficients
for this modified indicator remain negative, indicating that it is not necessarily true that
more aggressive lending policies imply a less accurate selection of the customers.
As far the profitability indicator is concerned, the positive sign of the current ROA
coefficient indicates that banks tend to use provisions to stabilise their income over time, as
found by Arpa et al. (2001), Bikker and Hu (2002) and Valckx (2003). Banks’ cyclical
behaviour appears therefore to be partially offset by income-smoothing policies.
The negative sign of URC is quite puzzling; a possible explanation is that GDPCC
already captures the effects of the business cycle. Lagged interest rate spread shows, as
expected, a positive association with LLP, making plausible the hypotheses that it either
proxies risk taking or anticipates cyclical downturns; however, it is worth underlining that
the indicator is calculated for the banking system as a whole and can therefore hide
differences across banks.
The coefficient on the treasury bond rate (BTPR) shows a negative sign, which
should support the idea that the variable represents a generic business cycle indicator
rather than a proxy for debt burden. As in previous empirical analysis financial asset
prices (MIBC) show a boom and bust cycle with negative lagged coefficients and
positive contemporaneous coefficients; the overall long-run effect is negative, but it
does not seem particularly relevant. Finally, as expected, banks provision according to
the overall riskiness of their portfolio (RISKST) and to their ability to effectively select
new customers (RISKFL). The past history of bad debts is therefore an important
element in banks’ choice of their provisioning policies.
As far as the overall goodness of fit is concerned, the value of the R-squared (0.5 per
cent) is acceptable and in line with the previous literature. Moreover, the model picks up the
main turning points of the evolution of LLP and the confidence intervals for the (in-sample)
predictions are reasonably small (fig. 2).
Fig. 218
The fixed effect model seems appropriate as confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan
Lagrange multiplier and the Hausman tests that reject the pooled regression and the random
effect model respectively. The F-test confirms that the individual dummies are jointly
significant at any conventional level. In any case, coefficient estimates seem robust to
different estimations techniques; for instance, the partial effect of GDPCC is not
dramatically different in the three specifications
13.
5.1.2 Dynamic model
Although the static estimates appear very supportive of the conjecture that loan loss
provisions are cyclical, the exercise is replicated including some dynamics.
The resulting regression is the following:
LLPit = α + ΣγjLLPit-j + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui +εit
i= 1,..., 207; t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable
that, once first differenced, reduces to:
∆LLPit = Σγj∆LLPit-j + ∆BSVit-jβ + ∆MVt-jδ +∆εit
The need to difference the equation reduces the time period available for the
estimation by one further year. Compared with the static model, I introduce two lags of the
dependent variable and I start with a relatively more general specification.
I treat all the explanatory variables as strictly exogenous, except the contemporaneous
values of the bank specific indicators, which are treated as endogenous. In principle, also
some of the current macroeconomic variables might be endogenous, since banking system
performance is likely to have second round effects on the real economy. Granger causality
tests carried out on the aggregated series generally exclude that microeconomic variables
                                                          
13 In this kind of investigation the reliability of the empirical results may be undermined by the
presence of structural changes. As far as Italian banks are concerned, a possible break may be due to the
reform of the banking law in 1993 (which came into force in 1994). Problems of multicollinearity in sub-
samples make it difficult to carry out a complete Chow test for the stability of the coefficients. However,
since GDP growth is the key variable of the analysis, I include a time intercept dummy (D94 equal to 1
from 1994 and 0 otherwise) and two slope dummies for the lagged values of GDPCC (D94*L1GDPCC
and D94*L2GDPCC) and tested their joint significance. The coefficients of the dummies turn out to be
significant, picking up some possible break; nonetheless, the good performance of the fitted values allows
not to attach excessive emphasis to this problem.19
Granger cause macroeconomic ones
14; therefore, even though Granger non-causality is
weaker than the condition for exogeneity, I treat macroeconomic indicators as exogenous.
Finally, since the number of instruments may become very high using the Arellano-Bond
estimator, I allow up to 5 lags of the instrumented variables.
The one-step estimation results for the Arellano-Bond model are reported in table 8.
Table 8
They show an acceptable convergence with the outcomes of the static exercise.
Virtually all the relevant bank specific variables of the static model remain significant in the
dynamic equation and most of their coefficients turn out to be very close in magnitude to
the static ones. Both the stock and the flow riskiness indicators are highly significant and,
not surprisingly, are confirmed as the main microeconomic determinant of loan loss
provisions. Interestingly, the lags added in the dynamic model are significant, even though
the second lag of RISKST seems to absorb the information provided by the first lag, which
ceases to be significant. The return on assets is no longer significant as well, indicating that
the evidence of income-smoothing behaviour is not particularly robust, as suggested by
previous works.
The first lag of the dependent variable is significant and shows the expected sign.
Higher provisions in the past are therefore reflected in higher provisions now. The marginal
effect is not excessively high (0.15), consistent with the fact that the dependent variable is a
flow indicator.
As to the macroeconomic variables, apart from the stock exchange index changes
(MIBC), all the other relevant indicators continue to be significant. In particular, the long-
run effect of 1 per cent change in GDP on loan loss provisions is 0.13, as against 0.23
estimated with the static model. The 2-year delayed effect remains higher in size than the 1-
year one.
Table 8 also reports the Arellano-Bond tests for serial correlation in the differenced
residuals. The tests find evidence of significant negative first order autocorrelation, but fail
to reject the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation at 5 per cent significance
                                                          
14 In particular, no dependent variable Granger causes GDP growth at any conventional significance
level.20
level. The Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions based on the two-step GMM estimator
is not significant at any conventional level
15.
The plot of the actual and the fitted values is shown in figure 3
16.
Fig. 3
The comparison between the actual and the predicted values reveals that the model
provides on average acceptable estimates, picking up the main turning points. However, it
seems less precise at the beginning and at the end of the time-period under consideration; in
particular, actual values lie outside the 95 per cent confidence interval in 1999. The fact that
the model underestimates LLP in 2001 may be partly explained recalling that, in that year,
some important Italian banks had to make relevant provisions to deal with the crises of
several Latin American countries and some international conglomerates.
5.2 Credit quality: new bad debts
In Italy, according to the Legislative Decree 87/1992 and the supervisory guidelines,
exposures are to be valued at their estimated realisable value. Loans are therefore classified
as performing, substandard and bad debts depending on the intensity of the difficulties the
debtor is dealing with. In particular, exposures are classified as bad loans when, regardless
the existence of guarantees and collateral: i) the borrower has been declared insolvent or ii)
the borrower is facing serious economic difficulties that may threaten permanently his
ability to pay the loan back. Notwithstanding the lack of an objective definition of bad
loans, Italian banks tend to correctly classify their exposures and with appropriate timing
(Moody’s 2003), making them a good indicator of the riskiness of banks’ debtors. As for
LLP, I use the flow measure rather than the stock; since the indicator is built up as the ratio
of the loans classified as bad debts in the reference year to the performing loans outstanding
at the end of the previous year, it can be interpreted as a default rate
17.
                                                          
15 The Sargan test from the one-step estimator is not heteroskedasticity-consistent (see Arellano and
Bond, 1991).
16 Since the model is estimated in first difference and provides the one-step ahead changes of LLP, I
add the estimated changes at time t to the actual levels at time t-1 to obtain the predictions for the levels.
17 While the use of the flow of LLP is quite common in the empirical exercises (see, among the others,
Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Pain, 2003; Valckx, 2003), the flow of new bad debts is less widespread,
probably because of problems of data availability.21
Table 9 reports the correlation coefficients between the new bad debt ratio and the
relevant micro and macroeconomic indicators.
Table 9
Virtually all the macroeconomic variables are significantly correlated with banks’
portfolio riskiness and, as expected, bad debts tend to decrease during upturns. However, as
for loan loss provisions, the relation is not constant over time (fig. 4).
Fig. 4
For instance, the new bad debt ratio significantly increased during the 1993 recession,
but it did not in the last downturn. In fact, in 2001 and 2002, notwithstanding the very
negative economic conditions, bad debts did not show any significant increase. A possible
explanation for this difference is that banks improved their borrowers’ selection criteria in
the last years; besides, the historically very low level of interest rates and the limited level
of indebtedness may have helped firms and households to honour their debts even in such a
recessionary period.
5.2.1 Static model
The estimated model is:
RISKFLit = α + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui +εit
i= 1,..., 207; t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable
where RISKFL is the ratio of the flow of new bad debts to performing loans.
Most of the banks specific variables included in the model are the same employed in
the LLP equation and, more specifically:
•   CREDGR and CIRATIO, which should behave as described for the LLP equation.
•   INTM, the ratio of interest income to total assets, is a proxy of the riskiness of the
loans’ portfolio since higher interest rates should be typically charged against lower
quality credits, which are more likely to turn into bad debts. On the other hand, as
pointed out by Salas and Saurina (2002), INTM might proxy managers’ incentive to
switch to riskier credit policy when things turn bad, as signalled by the curbing of22
the margin. According to this second interpretation, the expected sign should be
negative, at least for the lagged coefficients.
•   EQCAPIT may be interpreted, in an agency cost framework, as a proxy for risk
taking behaviour. The higher the riskiness of the bank, the higher is the share of
equity capital the shareholders have to invest to convince other stakeholders to
support the bank.
The macroeconomic indicators are the same (and with the same lag structure) selected
for the LLP equation and namely: GDP changes (GDPC), T-bond interest rate (BTPR),
Stock Exchange index changes (MIBC), unemployment rate changes (URC) and the loan-
deposit rates spread (SPREAD).
The results for the bad debts equation are provided in table 10.
Table 10
A first interesting element arising from this equation is that only two bank specific
variables (lagged CREDGR and CIRATIO) turn out to be significant. However, while the
former shows the expected sign, the latter behaves in an odd way, changing its sign when
lagged. The behaviour of CIRATIO might be justified on the basis of the idea that high
values of the indicator not only reflect bank’s inefficiency, but also the use of more
advanced, but expensive, methodologies for screening borrowers (see Pain, 2003). This
interpretation, even though appealing in this context, does not seem very convincing. All
the proxies for risk taking behaviour (INTM and EQCAPIT) are not significant.
As far as the macroeconomic variables are concerned, bad debts increase in the
negative phases of the business cycle; however, the effect of GDP changes is not immediate
as suggested by previous work, but delayed by 1 and 2 years. In the long run, a 1 per cent
GDP growth makes the new bad debt ratio decrease by 0.13 percentage points, quite close
to the figure provided by Salas and Saurina. The evolution of interest rates seems to affect
debtors’ capacity to return their loans as shown by the positive coefficient of BTPR; by
contrast the coefficient of the SPREAD between loan and deposit rate has an unexpected
negative sign.  Unemployment, which showed the wrong sign in the LLP equation, show
now the expected positive association with bad debts, confirming that it affects borrowers’
disposable income and, in turn, their ability to pay back the debt. Moreover, its marginal
effect is relevant from an economic perspective, even though this largely depends on the23
way the indicator has been calculated.
Overall, the model fits data sufficiently well with a value of the R-squared equal to
0.5; the comparison between actual and fitted values is satisfying as well (fig. 5).
Fig. 5
There are some concerns on the suitability of the fixed effect model in this case since
the Hausman test fails to reject the random effect estimates. However, the values of the
coefficients in the RE regression are quite close to those of the LSDV one
18.
5.2.2 Dynamic model
The relation between the flow of new bad debts and the business cycle is re-estimated
in the context of a dynamic model.
The specification is as follows:
RISKFLit = α + ΣγjRISKFLit-j + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui +εit
i= 1,..., 207; t= 1987,..., 2002; j= 0, 1, 2 depending on the variable
Taking the first difference:
∆RISKFLit = Σγj∆RISKFLit-j + ∆BSVit-jβ + ∆MVt-jδ +∆εit
The starting model includes, along with the variable used in the static model, one lag
of the dependent variable. As in the LLP equation, I consider the contemporaneous values
of the banks’ specific regressors as endogenous and all the other explanatory variables as
exogenous. I allow up to 5 lags of the instrumented variables.
Table 11 shows the results for this model.
Table 11
The results show a satisfactory stability in terms of the coefficients’ signs, even
though some of the parameters are altered in magnitude. In particular, the effect of a 1 per
cent GDP increase on the flow of new bad debts is equal to around 0.31, as against 0.1324
found in the static model.
The lagged dependent variable is significant and, as expected, has a positive
coefficient. The magnitude (0.15) is much lower than that reported by Salas and Saurina
(around 0.5) who, however, use the stock of bad debts that are obviously stickier and more
persistent than the flow indicator.
In terms of the diagnostics, Arellano-Bond tests find significant negative first order
autocorrelation and no evidence of second order serial correlation; the Sargan test fails to
reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments at 5 per cent level. The model’s
fit appears adequate as shown in figure 6.
Fig. 6
The fitted values are generally close to the actual ones. However, there is some
evidence that the model is not completely accurate at the end of the estimation period. In
particular, in 2001 and 2002 the model tends to over-estimate the new bad debt ratio, while
actual data suggest that the recent downturn has not affected credit quality as heavily as in
the past, possibly because of the lower level of the interest rates or the improvement of
banks’ credit risk management.
5.3 Profitability: return on assets
The return on assets is a common measure of profitability (gross of provisions). With
respect to other indicators (such as the return on equity), it has the remarkable advantage of
not being affected by banks’ different balance-sheet policies and by fiscal issues.
Table 12 shows the correlation between the return on assets and some selected
explanatory variables. As suggested by common sense, GDP growth positively affects
banks’ income as well as high interest rates and bullish financial markets.
Table 12
Apart for the second half of the eighties, the relation between ROA and the business
cycle appears to be stable, even though the magnitude of the reaction of banks’ profits to
                                                                                                                                                                         
18 As for the LLP equation, I carried out a test for the stability of the coefficients that failed to reject25
macroeconomic shocks varies. For example, after the 1993 crisis, banks tended to recover
acceptable profitability levels quite slowly with respect to other periods of distress (fig. 7).
Fig. 7
5.3.1 Static model
The estimated model is:
ROAit = α + BSVit-jβ + MVt-jδ + ui +εit
i= 1,..., 207; t= 1988,..., 2002; j= 0, 1 depending on the variable
With respect to banks’ riskiness, profitability should reflect the overall condition of
the economy more quickly; besides, it should primarily reflect structural bank specific
factors. I thus employ a simpler specification, in which only the contemporaneous values of
most of the explanatory variables are considered (1-lag has been included for GDP changes,
credit growth, and the stock riskiness indicator).
The bank specific variables included in the most general model are:
•   CREDGR (contemporaneous and lagged) is expected to present a positive sign, as
the favourable evolution of the volumes managed by the banks is likely to produce
greater interest profits in the future.
•   cost-to-income ratio (CIRATIO) is clearly negatively related to the overall
profitability of the bank: less efficient intermediaries are less likely to register high
profits.
•   the EQCAPIT effect is not well defined ex ante; in fact high capital and reserves
may signal that the bank is involved in risky operations and therefore more likely to
incur in losses; on the other hand, riskier investments may carry higher returns.
•   RISKST has clearly a negative effect on bank’s profits, since bad loans increase
losses charged in the P&L account. Since the timing of the transformation of non-
performing loans into loan losses is not certain, 1-lag is introduced along with the
current value of the indicator.
                                                                                                                                                                         
the null of parameter constancy.26
•   FSERVIN measures the contribution of the earnings stemming from financial
services to banks’ profitability and proxies the ability of the intermediary to
diversify among different sources of income. More diversified banks are expected to
register on average higher returns.
•   SIZE is the standard control variable.
The macroeconomic indicators are:
•   GDPCC, which is obviously expected to show a positive association with banks’
profits.
•   BTPR should positively affect the ROA since banks’ loans generally have a long-
term horizon and therefore customers pay an interest rate linked to the long-term
one. Along with this direct effect, there could also be a second round effect, since
high long term rates tend to worsen economic growth; however, the former effect is
likely to be much more relevant than the latter (Bikker and Hu, 2002).
•   MIBC affects banks’ profits both directly, by increasing the market value of the
assets in their own portfolios, and indirectly through the increase of the
commissions charged to households and firms for financial services.
•   URC typically signals recessionary phases and can lead to the contraction of the
demand for banking services. Its effect is thus indirect.
•   SPREAD, along with CREDGR, is the basic determinant of the income arising from
the traditional banking activity and should present a positive sign.
The econometric results for this specification are reported in table 13.
Table 13
In general, most of the variables show the expected sign, even though it may appear
surprising that neither the contemporaneous nor the lagged values of CREDGR are
significant.
Considering the microeconomic variables, more diversified (higher FSERVIN) banks
tend to show higher profits; by contrast, less efficient ones (higher CIRATIO) are – as
expected – generally less profitable. EQCAPIT as well as the lagged value of RISKST have
the expected sign. It is plausible that the deterioration of the loan portfolio affects27
profitability with some delay. Bank’s SIZE is significant and negative.
As far as macroeconomic variables are concerned, it is interesting to notice that the
favourable evolution of the GDP positively affects banks’ profits, but with some delay
probably due to demand factors. This supports the inclusion of the lagged value of this
variable. Moreover, higher interest rates and bullish financial markets help banks’
profitability; SPREAD variable turns out to be not significant. As in the specification for
loan loss provisions, the change of the unemployment rate (URC) shows the wrong sign; the
use of a larger lag structure for this variable does not change this outcome.
The R-squared for the final specification is equal to 0.85; the plot of the actual and
fitted values and the 95 per cent confidence interval for the ROA specifications are reported
in figure 8. Except for 1989, the fitted values pick up the relevant turning points of banks’
profitability.
Fig. 8
 Finally, it is worth noting that both the pooled regression and the random effect
model are respectively rejected by the Breusch-Pagan and the Hausman tests; moreover, the
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the individual effects are jointly equal to zero is
rejected at all conventional level, confirming that the fixed effect model is adequate.
6. Robustness checks
In this section I carry out some robustness checks. First, I use a small panel of large
intermediaries to assess whether the econometric relations estimated so far are common to
different categories of banks. Second, I analyse whether the effects of GDP changes are
asymmetric, i.e. if their magnitude is different during upturns and downturns.
6.1 Are large banks different?
To verify whether the results obtained in the previous section are common for
different categories of banks, I re-estimate the fixed effect models using the balanced panel
of large banks. In general, I do not necessarily expect the microeconomic determinants of
banks’ behaviour to be exactly the same for larger intermediaries. However, I do assume
that the basic macroeconomic indicators remain significant and exhibit the same kind of28
association with the dependent variables.
The results of the regressions are reported in table 14.
Table 14
The outcomes are fairly similar to those obtained with the unbalanced panel, even
though there are some puzzling results regarding the bank specific variables, especially for
the ROA equation.
As in the unbalanced panel, provisions tend to decrease as a share of total assets when
GDP grows, but the current effect becomes positive and the long-run multiplier decreases in
magnitude. Moreover, the banks specific variables are never significant when lagged. This
evidence is somewhat puzzling; indeed it suggests, on the one hand, that large banks tend to
be less backward-looking in setting their provisioning policies, on the other, that they make
provisions only when problem loans actually materialise in their portfolios and do not use
them to smooth their income. This is consistent with the findings of the ECB (2001);
however, the small sample size recommends interpreting these results with caution.
Considering the new bad debt ratio, the evidence for large banks confirms that credit
quality deteriorates during the recessionary phases of the business cycle; the long-run
impact of GDP changes increase substantially in size, possibly suggesting that large banks
are more affected by the fluctuations of the real economy.
As already noted, the regression for the return on assets produces very ambiguous
results; nevertheless, it at least confirms the positive relation between GDP growth and
banks’ profits.
6.2 Do macroeconomic shocks have asymmetric effects?
In theory, the magnitude of the impact of GDP changes on banks’ performance might
differ depending on whether the economic system is in recessionary or expansionary
phases. If this is the case, it might be appropriate to use models that allow for this
asymmetry.
To deal with this issue, I re-estimate the static specifications introducing two slope
dummy variables that interact with GDP growth. The first dummy (DOWN) is equal to 1
during downswings and 0 otherwise; the second (UP), conversely, is equal to 1 during29
upswings and 0 otherwise. If GDP changes had asymmetric effects during
expansions/recessions, the coefficients of the interaction regressors should be significantly
different each other.
For dating the recessionary phases, I rely on the studies by Altissimo et al. (2000) and
Bruno and Otranto (2004), whose results are considered a very consistent description of the
evolution of the business cycle in Italy. During the period 1987-2002, they identify three
main recessions: the first one from March 1992 to July 1993, the second from November
1995 to November 1996, and the third at the end of 2001; I thus set DOWN equal to 1 for
1992-1993, 1996 and 2002.
Table 15 shows the coefficients of the interaction terms; the effects of the other
regressors remained roughly unchanged and are therefore omitted.
Table 15
It is interesting to note that the coefficients on the 1-year lagged GDPCC turn out to
be not significant during downturns for both the LLP and the RISKFL equations, possibly
suggesting that good economic conditions affect credit quality more rapidly than bad or that
the improvement of loan portfolios is reported by banks relatively quicker than their
deterioration.
However, the overall long-run impact of GDP changes on loan loss provisions, new
bad loans and the return on assets appears quite similar in the different sub-periods. Most
importantly, the F-tests generally fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are
equal during downswings and upswings; hence, data tend to exclude the presence of
significant asymmetries in the transmission of the macroeconomic shocks.
7. A possible supervisory use:  stress tests
Stress tests are increasingly used by the supervisory authorities to assess the resilience
of the financial system to adverse macroeconomic disturbances, thus enhancing their action.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision underlined the need for stress testing
when it published the “Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks” in
1996; banking supervisors have then established the use of stress tests as an important
component of the intermediaries’ internal-models approach to market risk monitoring.30
According to the new Capital Accord, the intermediaries will be required to run stress tests
for credit risk under the control of the national authorities, to ascertain if the capital buffers
are adequate.
Besides, in the context of the Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSAP), the
IMF, in addition to asking a sample of intermediaries to evaluate the impact of
macroeconomic shocks on their balance sheets, may invite national authorities to perform
the same task on an aggregate basis.
When setting up the framework for stress testing exercises, it is necessary to identify
the kind of risks that have to be considered and the range of factors to be included; indeed,
stress tests can be used to analyse the impact of a change in a single risk factor (sensitivity
test) or the effect of a simultaneous change in several risk factors (scenario analysis). It is
also important to determine whether the exercise should be based on historical scenarios,
assuming that past shocks may happen again, or rather on hypothetical scenarios, that is on
extreme but plausible changes in the external environment regardless of the historical
experience (Blaschke et al., 2001; Hoggarth et al., 2004)
19.
Specific methodological issues arise when aggregate stress tests have to be carried out
to identify structural vulnerabilities and the overall risk exposure of the banking system
(Hoggarth and Whitley, 2003). In principle, two solutions are available for the aggregation
rule: supervisors can define the macroeconomic shock, let the intermediaries evaluate its
impact on their balance sheets and then aggregate the bank-level outcomes to get the overall
effect (bottom-up approach) or, conversely, they can directly apply the shock to some sort
of banking system-level portfolio and analyse the aggregate effect (top-down approach). Of
course, in the bottom-up methodology, the issue of comparability is a relevant one since
each intermediary may employ different methodologies and modelling assumptions, making
the aggregation less reliable. Conversely, the top-down approach enhances the
comparability of the results, but it is typically based on historical relations
20.
                                                          
19 The construction of historical scenarios is relatively straightforward, but stress test based on this
method are eminently backward-looking and may be not very reliable over time, as market and
institutional structures change. By contrast, hypothetical scenarios are more flexible in the selection of
potential events and, therefore, they tend to be more forward-looking; on the other hand, it is often a hard
task to quantify the likelihood of a given event.
20 During the UK’s Financial Sector Assessment Programme, the Bank of England and the Financial
Services Authority set up detailed macroeconomic scenarios and supplied them to the UK banks as inputs31
In this section, I use the econometric relations estimated so far to simulate the impact
of some macroeconomic shocks on the Italian banking system. In particular, employing the
coefficients of the static models, I carry out both single factor stress tests, which are only a
rough attempt to quantify the aggregate effects of GDP changes, and scenario analyses,
which replicate the recessionary conditions of 1993 and the following recovery in 1994.
For the sensitivity analyses, I assume that all the variables for 2002 are constant, apart
from the GDP changes. Although GDP growth rates are not chosen according to any
historical/probabilistic criterion, the lower values include very extreme events; in particular,
a 1 per cent contraction of GDP has been experienced only once in the 18 years under
consideration, in the aftermath of the European Monetary System crisis in 1992-93. By
contrast, in the scenario analyses, all the relevant macroeconomic regressors are set at their
1993-1994 levels, ceteris paribus.
Table 16 shows the outcomes of the exercise.
Table 16
The results of the sensitivity analysis imply that, with respect to the 2002 baseline
scenario, two consecutive years of GDP decline would cause the loan loss provision ratio to
double and the new bad debt ratio to increase by 35 per cent.
Conversely, under the stress scenario that assumes a recession like the 1993 one, the
LLP ratio would increase from 0.82 in the baseline scenario to 1.35 per cent (1993
scenario); however, during the recovery period, the ratio would fall to 0.87 (1994 scenario).
With reference to the new bad debt ratio, it would  increase from 1.28 to 3.4 per cent at the
through of the cycle (2.6 per cent during the following recovery period). ROA would not
fall, but this is mainly due to the effect of the stock exchange variable, whose values in
2002 were much worse than those recorded in 1993 and 1994.
To assess the resilience of the banking system, these figures can be compared with
the pre-tax profit of banks and the level of supervisory capital above the minimum
requirements (i.e. the buffer against losses beyond banks’ income).
As far as loan loss provisions are concerned, over the period 2000-2002, the pre-tax
                                                                                                                                                                         
for their internal models; the results were compared with those obtained by the authorities (see Hoggarth
and Whitley, 2003).32
profit amounted, on average, to 2 per cent of total loans, a figure sufficient to cover the
extra-provisions resulting from the assumed shocks.
Regarding bad debts, under the very unfavourable scenario of insufficient earnings,
banks should cover loan losses by depleting the supervisory capital. During 2000-2002, as a
percentage of performing loans, excess capital was equal, on average, to 3.5. Assuming a 50
per cent loss-given-default, which is the historical figure for Italy, the excess capital would
be largely above the potential losses arising from bad debts (around 1.7 per cent of
performing loans). Banks could therefore deal with such an adverse shock while still
keeping capital levels above the regulatory minimum.
This kind of simulation presents of course some shortcomings. First of all, the ceteris
paribus hypothesis is not completely satisfactory, since micro and macroeconomic variables
generally move together. Second, the exercise neglects either any potential second round
effect or policy response. Results must thus be interpreted with caution; however, with this
caveat in mind, they provide some useful insights about the potential effects of the business
cycle on the stability of the Italian banking system.
8. Conclusions
Empirical observation suggests that banks behave procyclically since bad debts,
provisions and loan losses are generally very low during booms. They start to be recorded at
the peak of the upturn and rise significantly during the subsequent recession; this is often
coupled with the contraction of earnings. The consequence is that banks tighten credit
supply during downturns, thus further deepening the negative impact of the business cycle.
Several empirical works have investigated the issue of procyclicality in banking,
generally concluding that banks’ policies tend to be cyclical.
Following this stream of research, this paper analyses the behaviour of more than 200
Italian banks over almost two decades to understand if the stylised facts are confirmed in
the Italian case. With respect to previous studies, this paper attempts to provide a more
comprehensive framework, analysing the evolution of loan loss provisions, new bad debts
and profitability over the business cycle.
The econometric outcomes confirm that banks’ loan loss provisions, bad debts and
profits are affected by the evolution of the business cycle; in particular, while the flow of33
new bad debts and the provisions against loan losses tend to increase when economic
conditions deteriorate, bank profitability is higher during upturns. However, GDP growth
turns out to be significant only when lagged by 1 and 2 years, implying that the cyclical
impacts are not instantaneous, but delayed.
Variation in the premise of the models leaves the sign and the significance of the
macroeconomic variables basically unchanged, although the magnitude of the effects may
vary. For instance, the overall long-run partial effect of 1 per cent change of GDP on the
ratio between loan loss provisions and total loans swings between 0.13 and 0.23, depending
on the model; for the flow of new bad debts over performing loans, the long-run impact is
in the range 0.13-0.31. These findings are consistent with the evidence for other countries.
Moreover, data provide some support to the idea that intermediaries exploit
provisioning policies to stabilise their income over time; however, the evidence on the
income-smoothing hypothesis remains somewhat mixed, since the positive relation between
provisions and profits is not significant in all the specifications.
Along with the macroeconomic variables, several bank-level indicators are also
relevant in explaining the changes in the evolution of riskiness and profitability. This
corroborates the idea that the overall performance of the intermediaries is the result of the
interaction between the general economic framework and banks’ management.
Finally, the estimated relations are employed to stress test Italian banks’ portfolios
and, hence, to assess the resilience of the banking system to external shocks. The outcomes
suggest that, with respect to the 2002 baseline scenario, a recession like that experienced in
1993 would make the LLP ratio increase from 0.82 to 1.35 per cent and the new bad loan
ratio from 1.28 to 3.4 per cent. Even in such an unfavourable scenario, the level of Italian
banks’ earnings and capital buffers would be, on average, sufficient to absorb the effects of
the shocks. Even though they depend on the underlying assumptions, these results represent
an important step for quantifying the effects of the business cycle on the Italian banking
system.
 In the near future, the analysis will be extended by the use of alternative econometric
methodologies such as VARs, the design of different scenarios and the direct involvement
of banks in bottom-up exercises, since cross-checks are an essential part of stress testing
and the prerequisite for policy implementation.References
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Tab. 1







Unbalanced 1985-2002 3207 207 5 18 15.5






CIRATIO Cost-to-income ratio % Sup.statistics YES
FSERVIN Financial services revenue / gross income % Sup.statistics YES
EQCAPIT Equity capital / total assets % Sup.statistics YES
SIZE Log total assets % Sup.statistics YES
ROA ROA (operating profit / total assets) %S u p.statistics YES
LLP Loan loss provisions (flow) / total loans % Sup.statistics YES
RISKST Bad debts (gross of provisions) / total loans % Sup.statistics YES
RISKFL Flow of new bad debts (t) / performing loans (t-1) %C r e d i t  R e gister NO
CREDGR Credit growth % Sup.statistics YES
INTM Interest margin / total assets % Sup.statistics YES
LLPODD Ln (LLP / (100-LLP ))
RSKFLODD Ln (RISKFL / (100-RISKFL))
Macroeconomic
MIBC Milan Stock Exchange index - percentage change% R.D. database YES
BOTR Italian T-bill rate - level % R.D. database YES
BTPR Italian T-bond rate - level % R.D. database YES
URC Unemployment rate - percentage point change% R.D. database YES
SPREAD Spread between loan and deposit rate - level % R.D. database YES
GDPCC GDP - percentage change% R.D. database YES
INVCC Investment - percentage change% R.D. database YES
CONCC Consumption - percentage change% R.D. database YES
FLEV Firm leverage (debt / equity capital+debt) - level % R.D. database YES
HOUD Household indebtedness / GDP - level % R.D. database YES
SELECTED VARIABLESTab. 3
Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max Median
MIBC 20 14.3 33.2 -27.7 104.1 14.6
BOTR 20 9.5 4.5 2.8 17.5 10.4
BTPR 20 9.9 4.3 3.7 17.7 10.8
URC 20 0.1 0.7 -1.1 1.6 0.1
SPREAD 20 5.5 1.1 3.6 8.5 5.5
GDPCC 20 2.0 1.1 -0.9 3.9 2.0
INVCC 20 2.2 3.9 -10.9 7.1 3.0
CONCC 20 2.0 1.3 -2.0 3.8 2.3
FLEV 13 48.0 8.0 36.0 58.0 50.8
HOUD 14 14.4 4.2 8.4 22.2 13.3
MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICSTab. 4
Variable N. obs Mean STD Min Max Median
   CIRATIO 3207 63.2 14.8 9.1 291.3 63.4
   FSERVIN 3207 22.9 12.1 -53.4 87.6 22.6
   EQCAPIT 3207 8.3 4.2 0.9 63.7 7.7
   SIZE 3207 14.0 1.6 9.6 19.2 13.9
   ROA 3207 1.8 0.8 -4.5 6.0 1.8
   LLP 3207 1.1 1.0 0.0 7.7 0.8
   RISKST 3207 6.7 5.1 0.0 37.7 5.5
   RISKFL 3207 2.1 1.7 0.0 13.5 1.6
   CREDGR 3207 13.3 21.1 -94.0 533.0 11.8
   INTM 3207 3.7 1.2 0.0 7.1 3.7
   LLPODD 3207 -4.9 1.0 -10.2 -2.5 -4.8
RSKFLODD 3207 -4.2 0.9 -8.6 -1.9 -4.1





Raw data -3.062 *** -3.154 ***
Demeaned -3.276 *** -3.417 ***
Raw data -2.592 *** -3.146 ***
Demeaned -3.039 *** -3.422 ***
Raw data -2.266 *** -2.964 ***
Demeaned -2.382 *** -2.841 ***
ROA
t-bar statistics - 2 lags
IPS TESTS FOR UNIT ROOTS (1)
LLP
RISKFL
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Im, Pesaran and Shin tests for unit roots in panel data based on
the mean of the individual Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics of each unit
in the panel (Ho: presence of a unit root). Tests are carried out on a balanced
panel of 1802 obs. (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum and F. Bornhorst).Tab. 6
LLP CREDGR CIRATIO ROA RISKST RISKFL GDPCC L1GDPCC L2GDPCC BTPR MIBC URC SPREAD
LLP 1.000
CREDGR -0.148 1.000
CIRATIO 0.128 0.029 1.000
ROA -0.028 0.012 -0.656 1.000
RISKST 0.444 -0.211 0.169 -0.168 1.000
RISKFL 0.419 -0.046 0.064 0.018 0.505 1.000
GDPCC -0.124 0.108 -0.025 0.058 0.062 -0.086 1.000
L1GDPCC -0.178 0.099 -0.083 0.104 -0.048 -0.119 0.364 1.000
L2GDPCC -0.206 0.060 -0.049 0.042 -0.110 -0.107 -0.066 0.341 1.000
BTPR -0.062 0.059 -0.063 0.219 -0.043 0.228 0.220 0.106 0.080 1.000
MIBC 0.016 -0.018 -0.022 0.065 0.084 0.117 0.130 -0.018 -0.151 -0.016 1.000
URC 0.112 -0.126 0.001 0.119 0.073 0.284 -0.308 -0.342 -0.264 0.241 0.464 1.000
SPREAD -0.034 0.009 -0.034 0.183 -0.042 0.192 0.011 0.089 0.069 0.826 -0.157 0.347 1.000
Coefficients in bold are significant at 5 per cent level.


















Intercept -0.3338 0.2098 -0.0906 0.1551 -0.0766 0.1438
BANK 
SPECIFIC
CREDGR +/- -0.0114 0.0015 *** -0.0065 0.0021 *** -0.0076 0.0010 ***
L1CREDGR +/- -0.0058 0.0017 *** -0.0020 0.0013 -0.0025 0.0009 ***
CIRATIO +
L1CIRATIO +
ROA + 0.1406 0.0417 *** 0.0787 0.0306 *** 0.0887 0.0239 ***
RISKST +
L1RISKST + 0.0540 0.0075 *** 0.0437 0.0062 *** 0.0470 0.0045 ***
RISKFL + 0.1941 0.0215 *** 0.1787 0.0209 *** 0.1845 0.0118 ***
L1RISKFL + 0.0659 0.0189 *** 0.0743 0.0182 *** 0.0687 0.0122 ***
MACRO
BTPR +/- -0.0282 0.0096 *** -0.0313 0.0102 *** -0.0324 0.0095 ***
L1BTPR +/- -0.0280 0.0136 ** -0.0220 0.0152 -0.0216 0.0148
MIBC + 0.0031 0.0007 *** -0.0220 0.0008 *** 0.0030 0.0008 ***
L1MIBC - -0.0039 0.0006 *** -0.0034 0.0006 *** -0.0036 0.0006 ***
URC + -0.3087 0.0472 *** -0.2763 0.0498 *** -0.2846 0.0487 ***
L1URC +
SPREAD +
L1SPREAD + 0.2539 0.0443 *** 0.2477 0.0467 *** 0.2443 0.0402 ***
GDPCC -
L1GDPCC - -0.0564 0.0191 *** -0.0514 0.0200 *** -0.0565 0.0191 ***
L2GDPCC - -0.1701 0.0177 *** -0.1711 0.0197 *** -0.1731 0.0163 ***
Nr. Obs.
R2 
Wald-test (3) *** *** ***
F-test all FE=0 ***
B-P LM (4) ***
Hausman (5) ***
Panel-hetero (6) ***
Panel-AR (1) (7) **
Chi2 (206) = 1.7e+31
F (1, 200) = 4.704
Random effects
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS - STATIC SPECIFICATION (1)
Fixed effects (LSDV) Pooled Regression
2642
0.51
F (14, 2627) = 41.21
Chi2 (1) = 187.33
F (14, 2422) =89.36
F (205, 2442) =3.27
Chi2 (14) = 139.93
Chi2 (14) = 1378.03
2642 2642
0.37
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Static model in which the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans is the dependent variable. The most parsimonious specification
of the LSDV model has been selected via general-to-simple approach. The coefficients of the individual effects are not reported. (2) Newey-
West robust standard errors; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to 2 lags (Stata routine provided by D.
Roodman).  (3)  Wald  test  that  all  the  coefficients  (except  intercept  and  FE)  are  jointly  not  significant.  (4)  Breusch-Pagan  Lagrange  multiplier
 for   the pooled model  (Ho:  pooled  regression  against  Ha:  RE).  (5)  Hausman  test  for  random  effects  (Ho:  RE  against  Ha:  FE).  (6)  Modified
Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect model (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum). (7) Wooldridge test for first order
serial correlation (Stata routine provided by D. M. Drukker).Tab. 8
Explanatory variable Exp. Sign Coeffic. Robust SE (2) Sign. Lev.
Intercept 0.0347 0.0124 ***
BANK SPECIFIC
L1LLP + 0.1534 0.0401 ***
L2LLP +
CREDGR +/- -0.0105 0.0019 ***







L2RISKST + 0.0387 0.0116 ***
RISKFL + 0.1946 0.0325 ***
L1RISKFL + 0.0549 0.0187 ***
L2RISKFL + 0.0480 0.0161 ***
MACRO
BTPR +/-




L1URC + -0.2512 0.0471 ***
L2URC + 0.2365 0.0336 ***
SPREAD + 0.2833 0.0372 ***
L1SPREAD +
GDPCC -
L1GDPCC - -0.0557 0.0197 ***




Arellano-Bond AR (1) (5) ***
Arellano-Bond AR (2) (5) *
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
LOAN LOSS PROVISIONS - DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION (1)
z = -7.79
z =  1.92
First differenced equation
2400
Chi2(26)  = 698.58
Chi2(270)  = 193.51
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Dynamic (first differenced) model in which the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans is the
dependent variable. The results are from the one-step GMM estimator. All the regressors are treated as
exogenous, except the contemporaneous bank-specific variables that are considered endogenous. The most
parsimonious specification has been selected via general-to-simple approach. (2) Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors. (3) Wald test that all the coefficients are jointly not significant. (4) Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions from the two-step estimator. (5) Arellano-Bond test for first and second order
autocorrelation in the residuals.Tab. 9
RISKFL CREDGR CIRATIO INTM EQCAPIT GDPCC L1GDPCC L2GDPCC BTPR MIBC URC SPREAD
RISKFL 1.000
CREDGR -0.046 1.000
CIRATIO 0.064 0.029 1.000
INTM 0.193 -0.010 -0.127 1.000
EQCAPIT 0.038 -0.035 -0.081 0.170 1.000
GDPCC -0.086 0.108 -0.025 0.063 -0.191 1.000
L1GDPCC -0.119 0.099 -0.083 0.072 -0.206 0.364 1.000
L2GDPCC -0.107 0.060 -0.049 0.038 -0.147 -0.066 0.341 1.000
BTPR 0.228 0.059 -0.063 0.420 -0.171 0.220 0.106 0.080 1.000
MIBC 0.117 -0.018 -0.022 0.053 -0.112 0.130 -0.018 -0.151 -0.016 1.000
URC 0.284 -0.126 0.001 0.238 -0.041 -0.308 -0.342 -0.264 0.241 0.464 1.000
SPREAD 0.192 0.009 -0.034 0.391 -0.093 0.011 0.089 0.069 0.826 -0.157 0.347 1.000
Coefficients in bold are significant at 5 per cent level.






















L1CREDGR +/- -0.0057 0.0022 *** -0.0063 0.0020 *** -0.0056 0.0015 ***
CIRATIO + 0.0094 0.0027 *** 0.0157 0.0032 *** 0.0113 0.0027 ***






BTPR +/- 0.0496 0.0188 *** 0.0437 0.0237 * 0.0494 0.0192 ***
L1BTPR +/- 0.1113 0.0179 *** 0.1172 0.0219 *** 0.1123 0.0175 ***
MIBC +
L1MIBC -
URC + 0.4413 0.0736 *** 0.4164 0.0877 *** 0.4354 0.0705 ***
L1URC +
SPREAD + -0.2344 0.0448 *** -0.2146 0.0520 *** -0.2319 0.0450 ***
L1SPREAD +
GDPCC -
L1GDPCC - -0.0719 0.0313 ** -0.0782 0.0388 * -0.0726 0.0325 **
L2GDPCC - -0.0603 0.0248 ** -0.0501 0.0312 -0.0572 0.0237 **
Nr. Obs.
R2 
Wald-test (3) *** *** ***
F-test all FE=0 ***
B-P LM (4) ***
Hausman (5)
Panel-hetero (6) ***
Panel-AR (1) (7) ***
Chi2 (9) = 8.71
Chi2 (206) = 3.3e+31
F(1, 200) = 26.485
Chi2 (9) = 663.23 F(9, 2427) = 67.08 F(9, 2632)  = 29.77
 F (205, 2427) = 8.20




 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
FLOW OF NEW BAD DEBTS - STATIC SPECIFICATION
Fixed effects (LSDV) Pooled Regression
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Static model in which the ratio of the flow of new bad debts to total loans is the dependent variable. The most parsimonious
specification of the LSDV model has been selected via general-to-simple approach. The coefficients of the individual effects are not reported.
(2) Newey-West robust standard errors; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to 2 lags (Stata routine provided by
D. Roodman). (3) Wald test that all the coefficients (except intercept and FE) are jointly not significant. (4) Breusch-Pagan Lagrange
multiplier  for    the pooled model  (Ho:  pooled  regression  against  Ha:  RE).  (5)  Hausman  test  for  random  effects  (Ho:  RE  against  Ha:  FE).  (6)
Modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect model (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum). (7) Wooldridge test for
first order serial correlation (Stata routine provided by D. M. Drukker).Tab. 11
Explanatory variable Exp. Sign Coeffic. Robust SE (2) Sign. Lev.
Intercept -0.0446 0.0202 **
BANK SPECIFIC
L1RISKFL 0.1501 0.0325 ***
CREDGR +/-
L1CREDGR +/- -0.0085 0.0028 ***
CIRATIO +







BTPR +/- 0.0884 0.0250 ***
L1BTPR +/- 0.1070 0.0240 ***
MIBC + 0.0049 0.0016 ***
L1MIBC -
URC + 0.4081 0.0938 ***
L1URC +
SPREAD + -0.3118 0.0585 ***
L1SPREAD + -0.2066 0.0794 ***
GDPCC - -0.2122 0.0482 ***
L1GDPCC -




Arellano-Bond AR (1) (5) ***
Arellano-Bond AR (2) (5)
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
FLOW OF NEW BAD DEBTS - DYNAMIC SPECIFICATION (1)
z =  -7.54
z =   0.69
First differenced equation
2400
Chi2(134)      =    157.88
Chi2(11)      =    250.62
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Dynamic (first differenced) model in which the ratio of the flow of new bad debts to total loans
is the dependent variable. The results are from the one-step GMM estimator. All the regressors are treated
as exogenous, except the contemporaneous bank-specific variables that are considered endogenous. The
most parsimonious specification has been selected via general-to-simple approach. (2) Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors. (3) Wald test that all the coefficients are jointly not significant. (4) Sargan test of
over-identifying restrictions from the two-step estimator. (5) Arellano-Bond test for first and second order
autocorrelation in the residuals.Tab. 12
ROA CREDGR CIRATIO EQCAPIT SIZE RISKST FSERVIN GDPCC L1GDPCC BTPR MIBC URC SPREAD
ROA 1.000
CREDGR 0.012 1.000
CIRATIO -0.656 0.029 1.000
EQCAPIT 0.222 -0.035 -0.081 1.000
SIZE -0.265 -0.088 -0.036 -0.232 1.000
RISKST -0.168 -0.211 0.169 0.044 -0.098 1.000
FSERVIN -0.122 0.086 0.241 -0.006 0.177 -0.150 1.000
GDPCC 0.058 0.108 -0.025 -0.191 -0.095 0.062 -0.018 1.000
L1GDPCC 0.104 0.099 -0.083 -0.206 -0.082 -0.048 -0.039 0.364 1.000
BTPR 0.219 0.059 -0.063 -0.171 -0.153 -0.043 -0.374 0.220 0.106 1.000
MIBC 0.065 -0.018 -0.022 -0.112 -0.076 0.084 0.022 0.130 -0.018 -0.016 1.000
URC 0.119 -0.126 0.001 -0.041 -0.074 0.073 -0.160 -0.308 -0.342 0.241 0.464 1.000
SPREAD 0.183 0.009 -0.034 -0.093 -0.111 -0.042 -0.357 0.011 0.089 0.826 -0.157 0.347 1.000
Coefficients in bold are significant at 5 per cent level.























CIRATIO - -0.0393 0.0070 *** -0.0385 0.0034 *** -0.0395 0.0007 ***
EQCAPIT +/- 0.0347 0.0050 *** 0.0345 0.0061 *** 0.0333 0.0026 ***
SIZE +/- -0.2649 0.0298 *** -0.1286 0.0106 *** -0.1734 0.0146 ***
RISKST -
L1RISKST - -0.0224 0.0051 *** -0.0107 0.0033 *** -0.0203 0.0019 ***
FSERVIN + 0.0123 0.0036 *** 0.0134 0.0018 *** 0.0121 0.0009 ***
MACRO
BTPR + 0.0334 0.0055 *** 0.0515 0.0040 *** 0.0406 0.0024 ***
MIBC + 0.0007 0.0003 ** 0.0011 0.0004 *** 0.0009 0.0003 ***
URC - 0.0784 0.0180 *** 0.1190 0.0196 *** 0.0906 0.0116 ***
SPREAD +
GDPCC +
L1GDPCC + 0.0361 0.0163 ** 0.0829 0.0120 *** 0.0484 0.0070 ***
Nr. Obs.
R2 
Wald-test (3) *** *** ***
F-test all FE=0 ***
B-P LM (4) ***
Hausman (5) ***
Panel-hetero (6) ***
Panel-AR (1) (7) ***
F(9, 2695) = 252.53
F (206, 2695) = 22.32
Chi2 (207) = 1.1e+05
F (1, 202) = 17.680
2911
Chi2 (9) = 5707.70
Chi2 (9) = 46.99
Chi2 (1) = 4562.34






 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - UNBALANCED PANEL
RETURN ON ASSETS - STATIC SPECIFICATION
Fixed effects(LSDV) Pooled Regression
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Static model in which the return on assets is the dependent variable. The most parsimonious specification of the LSDV model has
been selected via general-to-simple approach. The coefficients of the individual effects are not reported. (2) Newey-West robust standard
errors; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to 2 lags (Stata routine provided by D. Roodman). (3) Wald test
that  all  the  coefficients   (except  intercept  and  FE)  are  jointly  not  significant.  (4)   Breusch-Pagan  Lagrange  multiplier  for the pooled model
(Ho: pooled regression against Ha: RE). (5) Hausman test for random effects (Ho: RE against Ha: FE). (6) Modified Wald statistic for
groupwise heteroskedasticity in fixed effect model (Stata routine provided by C. F. Baum). (7) Wooldridge test for first order serial


















Intercept -0.2952 0.2894 0.8946 1.0366 4.0958 0.1987 ***
BANK 
SPECIFIC
CREDGR -0.0136 0.0057 **
L1CREDGR -0.0173 0.0073 ** -0.0073 0.0040 *
CIRATIO 0.0275 0.0107 ** -0.0565 0.0034 ***
L1CIRATIO -0.0286 0.0129 **
ROA
RISKST 0.0557 0.0181 ** 0.0140 0.0073 *
L1RISKST




EQCAPIT 0.0531 0.0192 ***
L1EQCAPIT 0.1396 0.0746 **
FSERVIN
MACRO
BTPR 0.0257 0.0055 ***
L1BTPR -0.0803 0.0181 *** 0.1711 0.0238 ***
MIBC 0.0098 0.0030 ***
L1MIBC -0.0038 0.0018 ** 0.0066 0.0025 ***
URC -0.2870 0.1130 ** 0.0426 0.0194 **
L1URC
SPREAD
L1SPREAD 0.3197 0.0690 ***
GDPCC 0.1135 0.0433 *** -0.2231 0.0550 ***
L1GDPCC -0.1282 0.0551 ** 0.0614 0.0194 ***
L2GDPCC -0.0955 0.0475 ** -0.1665 0.0464 ***
Nr. Obs.
R2 
Wald-test (3) *** *** ***
F-test all FE=0  ***  ***  ***
Panel-hetero (4)   ***  ***  ***
Panel-AR (1) (5)  *** F(1, 10) = 0.555
F(10, 156) = 19.17  
Chi2 (11) = 562.77
F( 1, 10) = 11.677
F(10, 169) = 19.31
Chi2 (11) = 339.88 Chi2 (11)= 181.91
F(1, 10) = 2.212
Return on assets
 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS - BALANCED PANEL
FIXED EFFECTS (LSDV) (1)
Loan loss provisions New bad debts
176
0.57
F(9, 156) = 17.01 F(10, 155) = 7.39
F(10, 155) = 3.82
F(7, 169) = 55.22
176 187
0.76 0.88
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) Grey areas denote the variables included in the most general specification for each equation; the most parsimonious
specification has been selected via general-to-simple approach. The coefficients of the individual effects are not reported. (2) Newey
West standard errors; the errors are assumed to be heteroskedastic and autocorrelated up to 2 lags (Stata routine provided by D.
Roodman).  (3)  Wald  test  that  all  the  coefficients  (except  intercept  and  FE)  are  jointly  not  significant.  (4)  Modified  Wald  statistic  for
groupwise  heteroskedasticity  in  fixed  effect  model  (Stata  routine  provided  by  C.  F.  Baum).  (5)  Wooldridge  test  for  first  order  serial
correlation (Stata routine provided by D. M. Drukker).Tab. 15
DOWN UP DOWN UP
0.020 -0.068 (***) -0.232 (***) -0.177 (***)
-0.012 -0.083 (***) -0.131 (**) -0.051 (**)
0.044 (***) 0.032 (*) n.a. n.a.
 F(1, 2420) = 1.17






F(1, 2694) = 1.81
F(1, 2420) = 2.99 *
ROA equation
IMPACT OF GDP GROWTH  DURING DOWNTURNS/UPTURNS (1)
L1GDPCC* L2GDPCC*
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Notes: (1) The table reports the coefficients of GDP growth for the static models in different phases of the
business cycle. Two intercept dummies interact with L1GDPCC and L2GDPCC: DOWN equal to 1 during
recessions (1992, 1993, 1996 and 2002) and 0 otherwise; UP equal to 1 during expansions and 0 otherwise. (2)
F-test that the coefficients of DOWN*L1GDPCC and UP*L1GDPCC (DOWN*L2GDPCC and








-1% 0 1% 2%
LLP 0.82 1.69 1.46 1.23 1.01 1.35 0.87
RISKFL 1.28 1.73 1.60 1.46 1.33 3.40 2.63
ROA 1.52 1.42 1.46 1.49 1.53 1.85 1.74
GDP Changes    (2)
STRESS TEST
Notes: (1) GDP changes in 2000 and 2001 were 3.1 and 1.8 per cent respectively. (2) The exercise
(sensitivity analysis) simulates the impact on LLP, bad loans and ROA of different GDP growth rates
(assuming that L1GDPCC=L2GDPCC), ceteris paribus. The static models and the 2002 values of all the
relevant regressors are used for the simulation. (3) All macroeconomic variables are set at 1993 and 1994
levels. The static models and the 2002 values of all the microeconomic regressors are used for the





















LLP (lhs) GDPCC (rhs)
FIG. 2 - LLP - STATIC MODEL
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Fitted Actual 95 per cent CI
FIG. 3 - LLP - DYNAMIC MODEL
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RISKFL (lhs) GDPCC (rhs)
FIG. 5 - NEW BAD DEBTS - STATIC MODEL
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Fitted Actual 95 per cent CI
FIG. 6 - NEW BAD DEBTS - DYNAMIC MODEL
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ROA (lhs) GDPCC (rhs)
FIG. 8 - ROA - STATIC MODEL
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Fitted Actual 95 per cent CI